Interstate Federalism by Brilmayer, Lea




Conflict of laws scholars appear to be about the only ones
concerned about what is going on in the evolving modern learn-
ing of interstate relations. By interstate relations, I am referring
to problems of adjudicative jurisdiction, legislative jurisdiction,
and enforcement of judgments. Although such relations are gov-
erned largely by state law, they are also affected by federal con-
stitutional provisions such as the due process clause, the full
faith and credit clause, and the commerce clause. These rela-
tions comprise the arcane field known as "conflict of laws," and
constitute "the other" federalism issue; the first such issue being
the relationship between the state and federal courts and
legislatures. l
Issues of federal/state relations, naturally, have received
plenty of attention. Their political implications are clear, given
the role that federal courts have taken in the civil rights strug-
gles.2 Nevertheless, most scholars ignore the rights of states with
regard to one another, and even the Supreme Court has consist-
ently treated these federalism issues with considerably less seri-
ousness than it has treated the relations between state and fed-
eral courts.3
The goal of this article is to convince a larger group of peo-
• This article is based on a speech given at the Federalist Society Symposium titled
"Federalism and Constitutional Checks and Balances: A Safeguard of Minority and
Individual Rights" held on November 15-16, 1986, at the American Law Center,
Northwestern School of Law.
•• Nathan Baker Professor of Law, Yale Law School. J.D., 1976, Boalt Hall; LL.M.,
1978, Columbia Law School. The author thanks Marjorie Colten for her research
assistance.
1. For an analysis of the Supreme Court's different treatment of these two issues,
see Brilmayer & Lee, State Sovereignty and the Two Faces of Federalism: A Compara-
tive Study of Federal Jurisdiction and the Conflict of Laws, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 833
(1985).
2. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (dealing with a technical issue of
Supreme Court review of ambiguous state court rulings).
3. See Brilmayer & Lee, supra note 1.
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pIe that something important is going on in the conflict of laws
arena, and it is something that people ought to be concerned
about. Conflict of laws, admittedly, is technical, but so are many
doctrinal issues whose implications are nevertheless widely ap-
preciated. Although no more technical than these, conflicts
seems nonetheless different because of the jargon, the arcane
and amusing schools of thought, and the virulence with which
the members of one school attack members of the others. These
features make it difficult for those outside the conflicts field to
appreciate the wider implications of the modern revolution in
conflicts theory, to evaluate their desirability, and to mount a
principled opposition.
Underlying these developments are some rather disturbing
premises that ought to dismay both the left and right political
wings. Moreover, the left/right dichotomy does have something
to do with the current lack of appreciation for the extent of the
problem. Interstate federalism does not fit neatly into the usual
political divisions. To some degree, those who favor the modern
conflicts revolution tend to be liberals; those who oppose it, con-
servatives.4 Nevertheless, the arguments that conservatives
ought to be making in opposition to the modern learning are not
entirely the usual conservative ones. The problem rests with the
dichotomy between property rights and political/civil rights. The
conservatives would at first seem to find their greatest support
4. At least, there is this general tendency on our current Supreme Court, although I
should emphasize that this generalization is a rather rough one. The four conflict of laws
decisions that provoked the greatest divisions in the Court were Asahi Metal Indus. Co.
v. Superior Court, 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981);
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Thomas v. Washington
GasLight, 448 U.S. 261 (1980). The voting patterns were as follows:
Justice WWV Hague Thomas Asahi
Brennan P P PP D
Marshall P P D D
Stevens D PP PP D
Blackmun P P PP D
White D P P D
Stewart D PP
Powell D D P DD
O'Connor DD
Burger D D P
Rehnquist D D D DD
Scalia DD
In this chart, "P" indicates a pro-plaintiff position, "D" indicates a holding for the de-
fendant, and PP (or DD) indicates a finding for the plaintiff (or defendant) on more
extreme theoretical grounds.
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in principles protecting property rights, but I suggest that a bet-
ter basis could be found in "liberal" arguments about political
process values.
This article begins with a description of several cases exem-
plifying the modern learning. Since most readers will probably
have little tolerance for discussions of "territorialism," "neo-ter-
ritorialism," "functionalism," "comparative impairment," and
"apparent true conflicts,"11 this article avoids such jargon and fo-
cuses instead on the astounding things that courts have actually
allowed to happen. The article also discusses some results that
might be reached if the modern learning is allowed to extend to
its logical conclusions. This is followed by a critical evaluation of
the general philosophical perspective which accounts for such
results.
This article then turns to a discussion of the nature of the
rights with which interstate federalism deals. It suggests that a
completely different perspective better accommodates the true
goal of choice of law restraints. This perspective, however, can-
not be politically pigeonholed. The arguments that we ought to
be making about conflict of laws are properly taken from the
liberal camp; yet the liberals are not motivated to make them.
The conservatives on the other hand have also effectively aban-
doned interstate federalism rights, perhaps because conflict of
laws cannot be squeezed into an appropriate property rights
mold. The end result is our current sordid state of affairs, a situ-
ation which now will be addressed.
II. SOME ACTUAL CASES AND SOME HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLES
Rosenthal v. Warren6 is a good starting point. RosenthW, a
citizen of New York, traveled to Boston, Massachusetts for diag-
nosis and treatment by Dr. Warren, a world renowned surgeon.
Mter surgery in New England Baptist Hospital, Rosenthal died.
His widow filed a medical malpractice claim for $1.25 million in
New York.7 Under Massachusetts law, recovery for wrongful
5. For an explanation of these terms and an introduction to the major theories un-
derlying the field, see generally L. BRILMAYER ET. AL•• AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISDICTION
IN THE AMERICAN FEDERAL SYSTEM (1986).
6. 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 856 (1973).
7. Jurisdiction was obtained over Warren by quasi-in-rem attachment of his insur-
ance policy, a practice no longer allowed after Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
Jurisdiction over the hospital was obtained by serving a hospital officer temporarily pre-
sent; the constitutionality of this method of service is unclear. See L. BRILMAYER, supra
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death was severely limited, while New York law allowed unlim-
ited recovery. Malpractice insurance premiums were, corre-
spondingly, much lower in Massachusetts than in New York:
$192 as opposed to $1,139. The court, however, applied New
York law because the decedent was a New York domiciliary and
his next-of-kin would be New York charges. The New York
court de-emphasized the importance of any party expectations
that Massachusetts law might apply because "one does not ordi-
narily think of wrongful death limitations even when undertak-
ing surgery."8 The court also pointed to the nationwide reputa-
tion of the hospital.9
A similar result was reached in Lilienthal v. Kaufman. lo
Kaufman, a resident of Oregon, approached Lilienthal in Cali-
fornia, and the two became involved in a joint venture to sell
binoculars. Lilienthal was unaware that Kaufman, after having
become involved in another binocular deal, had already been ad-
judged a spendthrift in Oregon. California law would not have
recognized the spendthrift adjudication as a defense, but Lilien-
thal unwisely initiated litigation in Oregon. The Oregon court
conceded that all of the relevant events (negotiation, loan, and
contemplated repayment) were in California rather than Oregon,
but it noted Oregon's extensive interests in the case:
The spendthrift's family which is to be protected by the estab-
lishment of the guardianship is presumably an Oregon family.
The public authority which may be charged with the expense
of supporting the spendthrift or his family, if he is permitted
to go unrestrained upon his wasteful way, will probably be an
Oregon public authority.ll
While conceding California's interest in having its law applied,
the court cited its duty to further the policies adopted by the
Oregon legislature, and denied recovery.
Admittedly, these were lower court cases, one from a federal
court and one from a state court, but an even more interesting
result is found in one of the most important recent conflicts de-
cisions of the United States Supreme Court, Allstate Insurance
Co. v. Hague.12 A Wisconsin domiciliary, Ralph Hague, owned
note 5, at 34.
8. 475 F.2d at 444.
9.Id.
10. 239 Or. I, 395 P.2d 543 (1964).
11. Id. at 14, 395 P.2d at 548.
12. 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
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three vehicles garaged in Wisconsin. An insurance policy issued
in Wisconsin specified uninsured motorists coverage of fifteen
thousand dollars per vehicle. Suit was brought on this policy af-
ter Ralph was killed in Wisconsin by a fellow Wisconsin driver.
Under Wisconsin law, recovery was limited to fifteen thousand
dollars, rather than forty-five thousand dollars, because the pol-
icy had a clause prohibiting the "stacking'" of coverage, and
these clauses were valid in Wisconsin.IS
Nevertheless, Wisconsin law was not applied. After Ralph's
death, his widow, Lavinia, moved to Minnesota and filed suit
there. The Minnesota court invalidated the anti-stacking provi-
sion, because it believed that Minnesota had the "better law."l4
Although without a majority opinion, the United States Su-
preme Court affirmed. A plurality held that application of Min-
nesota law was constitutional because of three factors: the widow
was now a resident of Minnesota (and her move was not moti-
vated by forum shopping), Allstate did other unrelated business
in Minnesota, and Ralph had been employed in Minnesota and
commuted there. The last factor gave Minnesota an interest in
protecting Ralph even though he was neither commuting nor en-
gaged in employment related travel at the time of the accident.II>
A concurring opinion by Justice Stevens went, perhaps,
even further. He expressed doubt about whether due process
would ever be violated by a court applying forum law because
preference for forum law could not be said to be irrational or
arbitrary. He suggested that application of Minnesota law had
not been shown to encroach upon Wisconsin sovereignty, and
that it was not fundamentally unfair to either of the litigants.
Fundamental unfairness might exist, in his view, if the law on its
face discriminated against non-residents, if it was a "dramatic
departure" from the rule in force in most states, or if it was sub-
stantively unfair.I6 One surmises from this that Justice Stevens
would have found application of Wisconsin law unconstitutional
(even if the case were heard in Wisconsin) because Wisconsin
13. One author disputes this version of the facts, claiming that even under Wiscon-
sin law the larger recovery would be allowed. Weintraub, Who's Afraid of Constitutional
Limitations an Choice of Law? 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 17 (1981). Since these are the facts
upon which the Court based its opinion, however, I chase to treat them as true.
14. Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289 N.W.2d 43, 49 (Minn. 1978), aff'd, 449 U.S. 302
(1981).
15. 449 U.S. at 313-19.
16. [d. at 326-27 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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had an extreme minority ruIe! A dissenting opinion took the plu-
rality to task. I '1
There are other recent indications that the Supreme Court's
attitude may not be quite as laissez-faire as suggested.IS But
what limitations will be recognized is uncertain. One particuIar
problem that is looming is whether a court has the right to apply
its law on "procedural" issues simply because it is the forum.19
The following is a typical scenario. Plaintiff is injured in State A
by one of the defendant's products that was purchased in State
A. Mter the statute of limitations runs, the plaintiff decides to
sue. Plaintiff then discovers that the defendant does business
also in State B, which has the longest limitations period in the
country. Jurisdiction is obtained in State B by pointing to the
defendant's unrelated business in State B, and State B applies
its own ruIe on the limitations issue because the issue is
"procedural."
One might think that the State B court wouId resent such
forum shopping and dismiss the case. But if the defendant re-
quests either a transfer or a forum non conveniens dismissal, it
may be conditioned upon agreeing to application of B's statute
of limitations in the new forum.20 Indeed, theoretically there
could be fora in which the statute of limitations will never run
because of a local tolling provision.21 For example, the statute of
limitations might be tolled as to a defendant not present in the
state until the defendant started to do business there at some
point many years after the events leading up to the litigation.
The Court's attitude toward forum shopping to obtain a
favorable statute of limitations is not yet settled, but still appar-
ently quite permissive.22
17. Id. at 332 (Powell, J., dissenting).
18. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985) (forum may not
automatically apply forum law in nationwide class action).
19. See, e.g., Cowan v. Ford Motor Co., 719 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1983); ct. Schreiber v.
Allis-Chalmers Corp., 611 F.2d 790 (10th Cir. 1979).
20. See, e.g., Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964) (transferee court must ap-
ply transferor court's law); E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 367 (1984) (citing
cases where dismissal conditioned on waiving statute of limitations objection in alterna-
tive forum).
21. See, e.g., G.D. Searle & Co. v. Cohn, 455 U.S. 404 (1982) (under the equal pro-
tection clause a state may toll statute of limitations as to defendant amenable to juris-
diction that had not appointed an agent for service of process).
22. In Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984), the Court allowed
personal jurisdiction on such facts, but did not specifically address the choice of law
issue. But ct. Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953) (allowing forum to
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The logical, if extreme, conclusion to which modern choice
of law thinking can lead is exemplified by one author's hypo-
thetical problem.
Driving through unfamiliar streets on business, Mr. Jones, the
plaintiff, a non-resident, rings a random doorbell to ask direc-
tions after making his way up a snowy path. On his way back
to the road, he observes a sign warning that the path is slip-
pery. Although he makes every effort to avoid an accident, he
slips on the unshoveled, unsanded snow on the path and is se-
riously injured. Under the law of the situs, there is no duty to
remove or sand snow on one's property, so long as one has
posted a warning; the law of the plaintiff's home state is to the
contrary ....
Since Ms. Smith, the homeowner defendant, specifically
relied on the law of her home state in postponing the task of
clearing the walk, and since she had no way of knowing in ad-
vance in which state her uninvited visitor resided, it might be
thought insupportable to hold her to duties intended to regu-
late landowners in that visitor's state . . . .
Yet imposition of liability would not be inappropriate.23
This example, and both Lilienthal and Rosenthal, share
common elements. In all three situations, there is a party who
never leaves his or her own state, who never even has deliberate
communication with anyone outside the state, who never does
anything with foreseeable impact outside the state, and yet is
nevertheless held to another state's law simply because his or
her opponent happens to be from that other state. One suspects
that the author's conclusion-the imposition of liability-is
highly counter-intuitive to those untrained in the subtleties of
modern conflict of laws reasoning. What sort of conflicts ap-
proach might generate such a result? The reasons offered for
this resolution of the hypothetical problem will be examined in
the course of explaining the philosophical perspective underlying
the modern conflicts learning.
III. THE PREVAILING PHILOSOPHY
These preceding examples do not arise at random; they are
the product of a prevailing philosophy of choice of law. Starting
apply its shorter statute of limitations). The author was counsel of record for the defense
in Keeton.
23. Weinberg, On Departing From Forum Law, 35 MERCER L. REV. 595, 623-24
(1984).
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in the 1930s with academic criticisms of the then-prevailing
rules embodied in the First Restatement of Conflicts, a move-
ment gained momentum in the 1950s and 1960s with Brainerd
Currie's work which culminated in a revolution in judicial treat-
ment of choice of law issues.24 Generalizing about the new learn-
ing is dangerous because so many academicians have added their
own variations and permutations,25 and because courts some-
times skip blithely from one method to another on their way to
their chosen conclusions.26 With some trepidation, however, I
group the distinctive characteristics of the new learning into
three categories: sensitivity to the needs of plaintiffs, lack of sen-
sitivity to the concerns of defendants, and pre-occupation with
the interest of the forum. I will illustrate each of these and try
to describe the philosophical perspective that accounts for them.
A. Plaintiff Orientation
Under the old approaches to choice of law, a body of rules
was consulted to determine which state's law should be applied.
The judge was not supposed to consider the content of the rules
in determining which to apply; he or she needed only to examine
the facts of the case and determine which jurisdiction was to
supply the relevant rule. Only after selection of the jurisdiction
was the judge supposed to ask what result the selected rule
would entail; the content of the rule was important on the mer-
its, but not at the threshold jurisdictional stage. Furthermore,
since there was a fixed body of rules, which all courts were sup-
posed to apply faithfully, plaintiffs supposedly would not be able
to engage in forum shopping.
All of this has changed. Selection of the applicable law now
is supposed to be decided according to whether any of the in-
volved states have "interests" in having their law applied. To
determine whether a state has an interest in applying its law, it
is necessary to examine the contending substantive laws and de-
cide whether the underlying policies are implicated by the par-
ticular interstate transaction at hand. For example, if State A
24. Many of Currie's articles are collected in B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963). The current status of the modern conflicts revolution in the
fifty states is set out in Kay, Theory into Practice: Choice of Law in the Courts, 34
MERCER L. REV. 521 (1983).
25. See L. BRILMAYER, supra note 5.
26. Some courts, for example, write opinions articulating no clear rationale at all.
Kay, supra note 24, at 521-22.
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uses strict liability and State B insists on proof of negligence,
then one policy underlying State A's rule is to provide recovery
for plaintiffs. This policy is supposedly implicated in all cases
that have a plaintiff from State A.27
This method is biased towards plaintiffs in several respects.
First, rules favoring plaintiffs tend to have a longer list of sup-
posed underlying policies. For instance, pro-recovery rules typi-
cally can be explained either in terms of allowing recovery for
injured plaintiffs, or in terms of deterring injurious conduct. Ac-
cordingly, there is an interest if either the injured plaintiff is a
local or the tortious conduct occurred within the state.28 Pro-
defendant rules, however, are not usually seen in terms of penal-
izing plaintiffs for their actions but only in terms of protecting
defendants.29 For example, strict liability arguably deters wrong-
ful manufacture, but negligence law is not designed to deter
plaintiffs. Since the forum is supposed to apply its law whenever
it has an interest in doing SO,30 pro-plaintiff laws are more likely
to implicate an interest, and thus be applied.
Second, it is entirely possible that more than one state will
have an interest in having its law applied. Such cases are called
"true conflicts." It is also possible that neither state will have an
interest; these are called "unprovided-for" cases. In such circum-
stances, the forum is counseled to apply its own law.31 Obvi-
ously, this means that the result will vary depending on where
the suit is filed, which opens room for jurisdictional manipula-
tion. Since the plaintiff is the one who chooses among the consti-
tutionally available fora, this room for manipulation is to the
plaintiff's advantage. Traditional approaches to choice of law
sought to provide uniform results regardless of where the action
27. The interest analysis approach to choice of law is critically described in
Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MICH. L. REV. 392
(1980).
28. See, e.g., Hurtado v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 574, 522 P.2d 666, 114 Cal. Rptr.
106 (1974).
29. See, e.g., Brilmayer, supra note 27, at 399.
30. Currie claimed that a court was obliged to apply its law whenever there was an
interest, because courts had obligations to further democratically formulated choices. B.
CURRIE, supra note 24, at 182 (courts should not weigh interests but should further the
interests of their own state).
31. Some authors even claim that it is unfair or discriminatory to not apply local
law when there is an interest in doing so, simply because some of the relevant events
occurred elsewhere. See, e.g., Allo, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague: An Unprovided-for-Case
in the Supreme Court, 32 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 103 (1981) (equal protection requires
that forum law be applied in true conflict or unprovided-for situations).
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was brought; forum shopping by plaintiffs was supposedly
minimized.32
Finally, there tends to be a bias in the definition of who
should be counted as a local party for purposes of determining
whether there is a local policy of allowing recovery. A plaintiff
can presumably be treated as a local if he, she or it is domiciled,
incorporated, has a residence, or has principal place of business
in the forum. But, as the previous discussion of the Hague case
indicates, some members of the Court have been willing to rec-
ognize an interest in protecting persons who move into the state
after the transaction or persons who had other connections with
the state (such as local employment). How far they will take this
reasoning is unclear.
In contrast, interests in protecting defendants have not
been so readily recognized. Cases do not, for instance, assert that
a corporation may be protected by a state even when all of the
events occurred elsewhere, simply because the state is one of the
many in which the corporation does business.33 For example, if
Allstate Insurance did business in all fifty states, perhaps states
other than just Wisconsin have a no-stacking rule. Did these
states have interests just because Allstate did unrelated business
there, in the same way that Minnesota had interests in local em-
ployees? How much of a showing ought to be required for a state
to find an interest is unclear. But, presumably, however strong a
showing is required for defendants should also be required for
plaintiffs. Instead, amorphous contacts seem adequate to sup-
port interests in protecting plaintiffs, while defendants must
show a more intimate connection to establish interests in pro-
tecting them.
The modern choice of law scholars are not overly squeamish
about admitting a plaintiff bias in their choice of law analysis. In
fact, the plaintiff bias is seen by some authors as an end in itself.
In the hypothetical given earlier about the duty to shovel snow
on one's property, the author's chief basis for imposing liability
was, quite bluntly, that she believed the plaintiff ought to be
allowed to recover, and imposition of the injured plainti~s home
state law allowed that recovery.
Although the failure to shovel snow may not be actionable at
32. See L. BRILMAYER, supra note 5, at 220.
33. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981) (the Court did not dis-
cuss the interests of the other states in which Allstate did business).
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the situs, it is a failure nevertheless; a homeowner must be
aware that the failure creates a condition of some risk, whether
or not a warning is posted. That the situs cheerfully places the
risk on the injured party is all very well when the injured party
is one of the situs' own residents. It seems a bit highhanded
when the injured party is a non-resident, particularly when the
costs of the injury will have to be borne in another state. As
between an innocent injured party and an insured or otherwise
suable party amenable to jurisdiction whose act or omission
caused the injury, widely shared policies favoring risk spread-
ing, compensating, and deterrence, coupled with considerations
of the foregoing kind suggest that the risk of accident should
not fall on the injured party, and that most courts would share
that view.34
Basically, the author's reason for choosing the plaintiff-favoring
rule is that it favors plaintiffs.
The reliance upon "widely shared policies" allowing recov-
ery is reiterated in other writings by the same author. Else-
where, she notes that state substantive laws have become in-
creasingly protective of plaintiffs. "Since the turn of the century,
the burden of statistically inevitable accident, for example, in-
creasingly has been shifted to defendant enterprises and away
from injured workers, consumers, and travelers .... As Ameri-
can substantive law has moved towards this more plaintiff-favor-
ing position, American conflicts law has followed suit."35 This
shift is justified by "the national interest in facilitating litigation
for the interstate plaintiff."3B This author is not alone; another
author, for example, approvingly cites the Minnesota rule of
"choose the more fully compensating tort law."37 In a similar
vein is Robert Sedler's reliance on "common policies" of promot-
ing recovery.38
This philosophy seems to be that courts exist because of the
necessity to transfer money from defendants to plaintiffs, and
therefore, the more often they do this, the more adequately they
34. Weinberg, supra note 23, at 624 (emphasis added).
35. Weinberg, Choice of Law and Minimal Scrutiny, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 440, 466-67
(1982).
36. Id. at 469-70.
37. Morrison, Death of Conflicts, 29 VILL. L. REV. 313, 337-38 (1984).
38. Sedler, Choice of Law in Michigan: Judicial Method and the Policy-Centered
Conflict of Laws, 29 WAYNE L. REV. 1193, 1210-11 (1983); Sedler, The Governmental
Interest Approach to Choice of Law, An Analysis and Reformulation, 25 UCLA L. REV.
181, 235 (1977).
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are performing their jobs. Plaintiffs are "innocent injured par-
ties," while defendants "cause injury," even when they act in
compliance with local law.
[A]ll states share plaintiff-encouraging policies of compensa-
tion, deterrence, enforcement, and validation [of contracts];
one state's occasional idiosyncractic defense need not be de-
ferred to ....
. . . The litmus test is multi-state policy: a departure from
forum law will be justified when there is 'better law' in the
non-forum state, law more representative of multi-state pol-
icy-that is, law more favorable (in the usual case) to the
plaintiff.39
This comparison between the recognition of plaintiffs' needs and
defendants' interests brings us to the second point: the modern
learning's attitudes toward defendants.
B. Lack of Concern for Defendants
If plaintiffs are seen by the modern learning as being pre-
sumptively entitled to receive compensation, defendants are en-
visioned as being presumptively obligated to pay. Who else will
foot the bill once it is recognized that the state has an interest in
affording recovery in order to prevent the injured person from
becoming a public charge? We have already noted the modern
learning's reluctance to find that some state has an "interest" in
protecting defendants.40 But the insensitivity to defendant's
needs goes further. To the naive, it might seem arguable that the
defendant should be entitled to protection, whether or not some
state has some "interest" in having its law applied. Perhaps the
defendant has-pardon the expression-a right to be protected.
But such reasoning is out of place in current thought.
The old learning envisioned things in terms of vested
rights.41 If a contract was entered into in State A, or if an injury
occurred there, then rights were said to have "vested" under the
laws of State A. The plaintiff could take these rights to any state
in the country, for the most part,"2 and cash them in; but he or
she was not supposed to be able to cash in more rights than were
39. Weinberg, supra note 23, at 600.
40. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
41. See L. BRILMAYER. supra note 5, at 218-20.
42. Even the traditional theory recognized some exceptions, such as "public policy"
or "procedural characterization," which allowed the forum to apply its law even though
the rights accrued elsewhere. See E. SCOLES & P. HAY. supra note 20, at 58-59, 72-75.
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acquired. Plaintiffs and defendants both had these rights. They
resembled the sort of rights that most of us would recognize in
final judgments.
Modern theorists see things differently. Vested rights went
out with formalism; legal realism recognizes that rights do not
amount to anything until they are translated into something
tangible by an actual court.43 The idea that the result might de-
pend on who is applying the law, or indeed upon what the judge
applying the law ate for breakfast, is no longer frightening. In
such a philosophical climate, allowing the plaintiff to shop
around for the best deal is no more perverse than allowing the
plaintiff to shop around for an automobile. The defendant/hos-
tage on the shopping spree has no legitimate complaint because
he or she never acquired a cognizable claim to any particular
state's law in the first place.
The rationalizations for this lack of sensitivity to the de-
fendant's interests are varied. The first explanation that is usu-
ally offered is insurance.44 Since defendants are insured, so the
argument goes, they have no legitimate complaint against impo-
sition of a pro-recovery law. Defendants are not only insured;
they are also supposedly superior risk distributors, an attitude
already alluded to in the discussion of why the plaintiff should
not be required to bear the risk of loss. These generalizations are
typically offered without any discussion of whether, in a particu-
lar situation, it might be better to require plaintiffs to carry in-
surance, or even whether in certain situations plaintiffs typically
do carry insurance.
While these can be powerful sentiments even in domestic
cases, they seem to be virtually irresistible in the conflict of laws
context. In domestic cases, substantive sentiments are often
checked simply because the law has been settled one way by a
superior court or legislature; in conflicts cases, there can be more
room for expression of such sentiments because deciding to ap-
ply the more favored substantive rule of another state is less vis-
ible than declaring hostility to one's own disfavored rule. In ad-
dition, the defendant and the insurance company may be from
43. The relationship between abandonment of vested rights and the growth of legal
realism is discussed in Dane, Vested Rights, "Vestedness", and Choice of Law, 96 YALE
L..J. 1191 (1987).
44. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)
(defendant can protect itself by procuring insurance); cf. Offshore Rental Co. v. Conti-
nental Oil Co., 22 Cal. 3d 157, 168-69, 583 P.2d 721, 728, 148 Cal. Rptr. 867, 874 (1978).
•
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out of state. In the presumably improbable event that plaintiff-
oriented rules might raise insurance premiums, the costs would
be borne by or at least shared with out-of-staters.
As might be imagined, these arguments are applied with
particular relish to large corporate defendants. It is argued, for
instance, that large corporations are particularly capable of as-
certaining the different laws of all of the states in which they do
business. Thus, if a corporation does some business in the state
(even business having no relationship to the transaction in ques-
tion) it has had an opportunity to determine what that state's
law is, and so it cannot be surprised should that law be ap-
plied.45 Of course, this equates ability to know what the law says
with ability to anticipate that it will be applied to a particular
case. Regardless of the lack of logic, it is similar to an argument
sometimes offered in support of extensive personal jurisdiction,
namely that large corporations experience little inconvenience if
required to litigate in distant fora.46
The final rationalization for lack of sensitivity to defendants
is that it does not matter whether the defendant is surprised by
application of some particular state's law because defendants
virtually never rely on the law anyway. Especially in tort cases,
it is said that the defendant has not relied on one state's laws
because people do not plan unintentional torts.47 Expectations
are said to be particularly irrelevant where insurance companies
are involved because insurance rates are readjusted to reflect
loss experience. "To talk of surprising an insurer by applying a
rule of law that makes a particular loss greater than it would
have been under a different law is talking nonsense."48
There is an interesting contrast here between the philoso-
phy of modern conflicts theory and the law and economics per-
spective. Law and economics emphasizes the role that law plays
in creating incentives and thus in influencing conduct. For in-
stance, there is a general assumption that where feasible, per-
sons will transact around unfavorable laws.49 Modern conflicts
45. See, for example, the argument in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 317-
18 (1981), that Allstate would not be surprised by application of Minnesota law, since it
did business there and must be presumed to be familiar with its laws.
46. Weintraub, Due Process Limitations on The Personal Jurisdiction of State
Courts: Time for a Change, 63 OR. L. REV. 485, 526 (1984).
47. Id. at 531; cf. Allo, supra note 31, at 70 (individual who is deaf to threats cannot
be deterred).
48. Weintraub, supra note 13, at 27.
49. The classic early statement of this idea is found in Coase, The Problem of Social
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theory, in contrast, seems to assume the opposite: the purpose of
law is simple transfer payments. Both schools of thought proba-
bly oversimplify enormously. But in a theory such as modern
conflicts learning that de-emphasizes certainty,50 it has to be as-
sumed that planning is unimportant. If individuals molded their
conduct around some particular law, then it would be unfair to
the defendant and it would give the plaintiff an undeserved
windfall if the plaintiff was allowed unilaterally to select a dif-
ferent law after the fact. If, however, the plaintiff and defendant
have not acted any differently because of the law, then arguably
there is no unfairness in changing the law at the last minute.
When modern conflicts learning doubts that individuals act dif-
ferently because of the law, this is another way of saying that
the defendant has no vested rights, and no claim to resist the
assertion of a state's interests.
C. Illegal Realism: The Role of the Courts
The final distinctive perspective of modern conflicts learn-
ing is its conception of the judicial function. The modern learn-
ing is the realists' creation. Conceived in opposition to the rule-
dominated conceptualism of the First Restatement of Conflicts,
it was built upon criticisms of the Restatement that had been
mounted by legal realists such as Walter Wheeler Cook.51 How-
ever, it is also philosophically linked with another school also
known as "realism." In international law, "realism" is the school
of thought that emphasizes sovereign states pursuing sovereign
interests, without misplaced sensitivity to the needs of other na-
tion states or of the international community. Both types of re-
alism are crucial to the modern conflicts learning, although the
influence of domestic legal realism is clearer and has been per-
ceptively noted.52
Consider domestic legal realism first. This type of realism
recognizes that judges have substantial discretion to make law.
The rules of the First Restatement of Conflicts were suspect be-
cause they were supposed to have been deduced by logical meth-
ods from first principles about vested rights. The old learning
Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
50. One of the foremost aspirations of the First Restatement was uniformity and
predictability. L. BRILMAYER. supra note 5, at 220.
51. See generally W. COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS (1942).
52. Dane, supra note 43.
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was therefore criticized by the guru of the conflicts revolution,
Brainerd Currie, as mechanical, metaphysical, and based upon a
desire to impose spurious uniformity upon a world of varying
laws.53 Moving to a system without such constraints opens up a
great deal of decision-making power for judges. Consequently,
the fact that the modern learning requires judges to engage in
amorphous, ad hoc assessments is not jurisprudentially troub-
ling.54 Evaluation of the underlying policies, it is claimed, is no
different in conflicts cases than in domestic cases.55 It therefore
becomes entirely understandable that the judges respond to
their own intuitive assessment of the merits of the dispute.
Judges, like any other people, want to reach fair and just resolu-
tions of the problems set before them, and the modern method-
ology claims to allow them to do so.56 What this usually means is
application of the law that the judge feels to be substantively
just; sometimes this is explained in terms of the forum's interest
as a "justice administering state."57
From this perspective, it is hard to see how it can be an
injustice to apply the substantively "more just" legal rule.58 For
one thing, cases do not look any different on the merits just be-
cause some of the elements occurred in another state. If one has
sympathy for the victims of defectively manufactured products,
one is not going to have any less sympathy simply because the
injury, the sale, or the manufacture occurred in another state.59
Furthermore, if the defendant complains about application of
the law allowing recovery, a judge may have little sympathy. Lo-
cal defendants are held to the higher standard of recovery; what
is this defendant asking for, better treatment than local defend-
53. L. BRILMAYER, ET. AL. supra note 5, at 223-33.
54. B. CURRIE, supra note 24, at 627 ("plead[s] guilty without reservation" to the
"ad hoc" nature of his analysis).
55.Id.
56. Sedler, Interest Analysis and Forum Preference in the Conflict of Law: A Re-
sponse to the "New Critics", 34 MERCER L. REV. 593, 601, 635-41 (1983) (interest analy-
sis promotes functionally sound and fair results).
57. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV.
267, 295 (1966).
58. See, for example, Justice Stevens' opinion in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, noting
that a defendant might show that application of local law was unconstitutional by show-
ing that it was substantively unfair. 449 U.S. 302, 326 (1981) (Stevens, J. concurring).
59. See, e.g., Weinberg, supra note 23, at 612 (legislature would not care about the
fact that an accident occurred outside the state-they would want same policies to
apply).
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ants get?60 So long as the substantive predilections of the judges
are considered relevant, rules requiring application of some
other state's laws may be flouted.
Finally, legal realism encourages judges to be frank about
their exercises of discretion. Under the First Restatement of
Conflicts, judges who wished to respond to what they saw as the
real merits of the dispute were obliged to manipulate its convo-
luted rules to obtain their desired results. Such manipulations
were scorned by the new learning as "escape devices".61 The new
methods sought to unveil the "real" processes of decision-mak-
ing, thereby encouraging judges to be honest about what they
were doing.62 If they were favoring forum law, or choosing the
law that benefited forum residents or plaintiffs, so be it. The
methodology should explain the foregoing, rather than try to co-
erce judges into reaching the results of some supposedly foreor-
dained set of metaphysical rules.
Despite the recognized importance of legal realism, the
other form of realism-international realism-is equally impor-
tant to the development of the modern conflicts outlook. It re-
flects another strand of modern conflicts thinking, namely a
judge's obligation to further the interests of his or her own state.
The modern learning supposedly is the best way to do this. For
example, Currie held (and many continue to argue) that if more
than one state have an interest, the court should further the in-
terests of its own state and disregard those of the others.63 The
reason for this approach was that courts had obligations to fur-
60. For instance, in Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 239 Or. 1, 395 P.2d 543 (1964), the de-
fendant had previously defrauded an Oregon resident and Oregon law prevented recov-
ery. It has been suggested that Lilienthal is explicable in terms of a desire not to treat
foreign plaintiffs better than local ones or, conversely, to treat local defendants sued by
foreign plaintiffs differently from local defendants sued by local plaintiffs. Weinberg,
supra note 23, at 605.
61. This characterization is picked up by several leading casebooks: see, e.g., R.
CRAMPTON, D. CURRIE & C. KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS. (3d ed. 1982); see also L. BRILMAYER,
supra note 5, at 226.
62. This is particularly true with regard to the "better law" approach. See Leflar,
supra note 57, at 300; cf. J. FRANK. LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 137 (1935) ("All judges
exercise discretion .... Shall the process be concealed or disclosed?").
63. B. CURRIE, supra note 24, at 182; AlIo, supra note 31, at 103. Currie later modi-
fied his view somewhat by saying that, where a conflict of interests was found to exist,
the forum might wish to reexamine its interests and take a more restrained view. But
even if a restrained second look uncovered a state interest, the forum was obliged to
further it. See Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Con-
flict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1233, 1242-43 (1963).
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ther the policy interests of their democratically elected
legislatures.64
It is, similarly, a basic tenet of international realism that
sovereign states are entitled to pursue their own interest, with-
out external constraints stemming from principles of interna-
tionallaw. Indeed, realists express doubt about whether interna-
tional law exists in any meaningful sense in virtually the same
way that some modern conflicts theorists insist that there are no
constitutional limits on choice of law, so long as the forum has
an "interest."611 An important assumption comes into play at this
point. That assumption is in essence the first principle of the
international realist perspective, namely that a state has a right
to do what is in its interest.
This assumption is far from self-evident. In fact, it seems
clearly false. There seems to be something of an agency argu-
ment at work. In the conflicts context, the argument is that the
court is the agent of the legislature and of the people. It would
be a breach of duty if the court failed to serve the interests of
those persons that it represents. In the international realist con-
text, the argument is that the government acts on behalf of the
state, and must therefore act to further the state's interests. But
the agent's duty to act on behalf of the principal does not make
it justifiable to take all steps that will further its client's inter-
ests. In particular, it is hard to see how that agent could be obli-
gated to further goals that the client would not be entitled to
further on its own behalf.66 The agent's duty might be overrid-
den by limitations on the principal's freedom of action.
The duty to further the client's interests might also be over-
ridden by limitations on what means may be employed. For ex-
ample, the managers of a corporation have an obligation to fur-
ther the interests of the shareholders, and a lawyer has an
obligation to further the interests of his or her clients. However,
a manager could not justify bribing a judge in a case where the
corporation was a defendant, on the grounds of an obligation to
further the stockholders' interests. Similarly, a lawyer could not
64. B. CURRIE, supra note 24, at 182-83.
65. Generally, the constitutional test for whether a choice of law is permissible is
whether an interest exists. For a recent exposition of this view, see Shreve, Interest
Analysis as Constitutional Law, 48 OHIO ST. L.J., 51, 71-77 (1987). For a discussion of
the realist view of international law, see C. BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS, 11-66 (1979).
66. Cohen, Moral Skepticism and International Relations in C. BEITZ, M COHEN, T.
SCANLON & A.J. SIMMONS, INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 3, 4 (1985).
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further a client's interest by destroying evidence or soliciting
perjured testimony. The fact that he or she had an obligation to
serve the client would not be an excuse. The same is true in the
international and conflict of laws contexts. Furthering the inter-
ests of one's state is not the only or even the most important
consideration. It is an obligation that operates within the limits
on what a state may legitimately seek, and within the limits on
the means an agent may employ to promote even legitimate
ends. Actions are not justifiable merely because they serve state
or national interests.
If the international realists have not been overly concerned
about such limitations of principle, they at least can somewhat
plausibly assert that states are compelled to protect their inter-
ests because in this global state of nature there is no one else
that can be trusted to do SO.67 While they might prefer to act on
principle and respect other states' interests, they may be disin-
clined to do so without assurances of reciprocity. The security
dilemma in international affairs may mean that the players set-
tle for sub-optimal outcomes because there is no Leviathan to
enforce proposed solutions to their prisoners' dilemma. Whether
or not this is convincing as a matter of internationallaw,68 the
same cannot be said within the United States, where the Su-
preme Court exists in part to prevent states from running rough-
shod over one another. There is no reason to settle for a sub-
optimal anarchy when workable methods of cooperation might
be developed. Nevertheless, the modern conflicts emphasis on
state interest persists.
The two different realist strands were both present in Cur-
rie's original presentation of the modern approach. But they
lead in different directions. Judicial discretion, and preference
for case-by-case adjudication as opposed to formalized rules, is
not the same as pursuit of forum interests. The first leads to
increased judicial power to implement "just results"; the second
involves single minded pursuit of the interests of the state. A
conflict arises where the judge thinks that the other state's law
is substantively superior-should he or she then "further jus-
tice," or further the interests that his or her institutional superi-
ors have defined? This tension accounts for a growing rift be-
67. C. BEITZ, supra note 65 (describing "state of nature" theories of international
law).
68. [d.
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tween those modern scholars who simply favor pro-plaintiff law
and those who first and foremost favor forum law. Some empha-
size the former,69 and some the latter.7o
Neither of these emerging subgroups of the modern school,
however, focus on principled arguments in favor of defendants.
Yet, it is the viewpoint of the individual protesting application
of forum law-usually the defendant71-that strikes one as pro-
viding the proper principled perspective on choice of law. The
needs of the plaintiff and of the forum are of only secondary
importance, to be considered once the defendant's legitimate
concerns are accounted for. After making this argument, I think
it will be easier to see why the rights of interstate federalism
have not found champions either in the political left or the polit-
ical right.
IV. THE PROPER PERSPECTIVE ON CONFLICT OF LAWS
Before a state court may reach the merits of any contro-
versy, it must first determine whether the defendant has a right
not to be subjected to state coercion. This issue is a threshold
question which must be addressed before it is legitimate to con-
sider the state's interest in subjecting an individual to its laws
and the plaintiff's interest in receiving the benefits provided by
those laws. The jurisdictional question, in other words, must be
addressed before either the state interests or the plaintiff's in-
terests are relevant. The reason for this is that the latter exist
only because there is some positive state law which creates them,
while the former is not necessarily a creation of state positive
law. It therefore begs the question to say that state interest or
plaintiffs' needs create a right to apply state law; rather, it is the
right to apply state law which makes the state interests or plain-
tiffs' needs relevant.
Consider first the claim that the needs of the plaintiff, the
proponent of local law, must be taken into account. Why must
the plaintiff's needs be considered? Obviously, because the
plaintiff has suffered an injury for which he or she seeks com-
pensation. Private law is designed, after all, to compensate in-
69. Weinberg, supra note 23.
70. Allo, supra note 31.
71. This is because the plaintiff selects the forum, which usually will have a law to
his or her advantage. One exception which comes to mind is Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 239
Or. 1, 395 P.2d 543 (1964), but such occurrences are relatively rare.
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jured plaintiffs. While this response is true, it overlooks one im-
portant thing: Not all injuries are compensated. If you contact
and die of influenza, you have suffered an injury, but this injury
is probably not compensable (even if it seems clear that you
must have contracted the disease from someone, and even if you
can prove who that person is).
There is nothing logically or morally necessary about leav-
ing the influenza victim without a private defendant to sue. The
lack of remedy occurs simply because the present state legal sys-
tems have typically chosen not to provide recovery in such cir-
cumstances. But that is precisely the point. Plaintiffs obtain
their rights to recovery from positive law. Until a plaintiff shows
that there is some positive law which bestows such a right, the
plaintiff has no legitimate interest that must be taken into ac-
count. The burden of persuasion, in other words, should be on
the plaintiff to show that some applicable legal norm grants such
an interest, and it is putting the cart before the horse to use the
plaintiffs need for compensation to show that some particular
positive law is applicable.
Take another look now at the snow shoveling example that
was discussed earlier. In support of the proposition that com-
pensation should be allowed, the author argued that "although
the failure to shovel snow may not be actionable at the situs, it
is a failure nevertheless; a homeowner must be aware that the
failure creates a condition of some risk, whether or not a warn-
ing is posted."72 In what sense is it "a failure nevertheless?" Cer-
tainly it is a failure in the literal sense of being an omission; to
fail to shovel snow is, by definition, a "failure." But something
more normative must be intended. The injured party also
"failed" to walk carefully enough to avoid an accident. But, ac-
cording to this author, this failure should not cause the plaintiff
to bear the risk of loss. The defendant should instead bear the
loss because she should have known that someone might get
hurt.
Whence comes this assumption? It must arise either out of
some "natural law" of torts or out of some positive law assigning
responsibility. Perhaps I am influenced by my view of natural
law, but substantive natural law of torts seems an implausible
basis for a choice of law theory. If there is a natural law of torts,
which overrides positive laws denying recovery, why does it op-
72. Weinberg, supra note 23, at 624.
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erate only in choice of law cases? Why does its vitality depend
upon its being part of a general modern trend towards recovery?
In any event, one suspects that such natural law arguments are
rather problematic since "general common law" was abolished in
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.73 But positive law is even a more
suspect source. As already argued, to find a source of plaintiff's
rights in positive law is to get the analysis backwards. We are
engaged, after all, in determining whether the pro-recovery law
applies to this case.
Can the same not be said of the defendant's rights-is this
argument not symmetrical? In one respect it is. Many defenses
that a defendant might raise (statute of limitations, assumption
of risk, etc.) are based on positive law. And with regard to such
defenses, the defendant is obligated to show that it is fair to
subject the plaintiff to them. This requires showing that a par-
ticular positive law applies. But a conflict of laws defense seems
to be of a different sort. It asserts a right to be free of particular
positive authority, whether adjudicative or legislative. It is dif-
ferent from an argument that the other party might fairly be
subjected to the legislative or adjudicative authority of the alter-
native state, an issue I have called "reciprocal contracts."7. Of
course, the fact that there are few contacts with the forum
means that there will be some other state with connections ade-
quate to support jurisdiction. But the right to be left alone is not
based upon the positive law of some alternative forum.
Even if the defendant needed a source for the right to be
left alone, moreover, there is one positive law source for such a
defense, namely the federal Constitution. This is a source that is
not usually subject to the same objection as raised against the
plaintiff's right of recovery, because there are no choice of law
issues with regard to application of a uniform federal law. In this
respect, the defendant's argument can safely be founded on a
sort of "natural" law, namely the Constitution.
The only circumstance in which relying on the Constitution
as a positive source for the defense may present difficulties is in
an international controversy. What if the plaintiff wants New
York law applied to a foreign defendant with no American con-
tacts? While there is a sense in which it makes perfect sense to
73. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
74. Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court Juris-
diction, 1980 SUP. CT. REV. 77, 110.
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evaluate this under the United States Constitution, from an-
other perspective it seems that the foreigner should not be re-
quired to rely in this way on American law. The gist of the com-
plaint, after all, is that the defendant is not subject to American
law; that he or she has a right to be left alone. This would ex-
clude even the Constitution. To make the same point a different
.way, what would happen if the Constitution was amended to
omit any limitations on legislative or adjudicative jurisdiction?
Could the defendant then be properly subjected to New York
law?
The point, which I make with some trepidation, is that no
law can simply bootstrap itself into applicability in this way.
The right to be free from some body of law, or some adjudica-
tory authority, does not necessarily stem from a particular posi-
tive law source. An alternative source perhaps exists in natural
law, or, perhaps better, in political philosophy. The argument is
that assertions of authority must be justified as a matter of po-
litical theory, and that in this sense the burden of proof is on the
proponent of authority. Normally the political authority is not
open to serious practical question-although it is always of in-
tense philosophical interest-but interstate problems by their
nature raise these questions as a practical matter. The question
in such jurisdictional disputes is always the proper sphere of
state or national authority.
I will return to this point. First, I wish to show that it is for
the same reason that the issue of the needs of the forum is also
secondary. As previously stated, one of the threads in modern
conflicts learning is the forum preference for its own law because
of the supposed duty of a forum court to further the interests of
its elected superiors. Once conflicts is re-interpreted as an issue
of political philosophy, it becomes clear how inadequate such ar-
guments are. The needs or policies of the forum, like those of
the plaintiff, are simply beside the point. They are relevant only
once the right of the forum to impose its will has been estab-
lished. What the state wants is irrelevant to whether it has a
right to be interested. This, once again, raises an issue of philo-
sophical justification. From this perspective, the thought that fo-
rum law should be the norm (applied except in unusual circum-
stances) is clearly wrong.711 The burden runs the other way; it is
75. Ct. B. CURRIE, supra note 24, at 3-76 (the law of the forum).
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the exercise of coercive authority which must be justified, not
the resistance to it.
Not surprising, the same arguments should be pertinent to
refute both the needs of the plaintiff and the interests of the
forum rationales. After all, the plaintiff has selected the forum
because it will apply its law or exercise adjudicatory authority to
the plaintiffls advantage. Their interests are, for this reason, al-
igned; if they were not, the plaintiff would have chosen a differ-
ent forum. And so the question in both cases is whether this
forum, which perceives its own interests in a way that coincides
with what the plaintiff wants, has a justification for asserting co-
ercive power over the defendant.
I realize that this way of phrasing the issue leads inevitably
into a natural law thicket. The relevant natural law precept is
simply that no government is entitled to exercise coercive au-
thority over an individual without adequate political justifica-
tion. I do not intend to inquire here into what might count as an
adequate justification.76 The point is merely to insist that the
question must be phrased in those terms. Furthermore, phrasing
things in these terms leads necessarily to focus on the defend-
ant, for it is the defendant typically who is experiencing the
state's coercive power.
While I have suggested that such principles must exist re-
gardless of whether the Constitution creates or recognizes them,
in fact the Constitution does reflect the sort of focus that I am
describing. In particular, it incorporates the point of view of the
party opposing the imposition of forum authority, asymmetri-
cally subordinating the interests of the party seeking state inter-
vention. The best manifestation of this perspective is the phras-
ing of the due process clause, which protects against state
deprivations of property. This provision asymmetrically protects
those who already have a life, liberty, or property interest, as
opposed to those who would like to obtain one. The needs of
those who seek compensation, and of the state that seeks to
compensate, are necessarily dependent upon the right to extract
compensation from the particular defendant before the court.
Persons cannot simply be chosen at random and required to
compensate injured individuals-unless there is adequate reason
to extract the judgment from a particular defendant, shifting the
76. That issue, unfortunately, must be left to future articles.
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loss onto that defendant is arbitrary, capricious and
unconstitutional.
Posing this as an issue of political theory has several conse-
quences. First, it renders inconsequential whether the imposi-
tion is de minimis or substantial. As a matter of principle, juris-
diction becomes a due process question like any other; even
minor impositions (speaking in financial terms) can count as ma-
jor violations." Furthermore, the fact that the defendant has
been led to expect a violation is no excuse. Such expectations
are no more relevant than the expectations created by telling a
welfare recipient in advance, "your benefits are going to be cut
off without a hearing." Unsurprising violations of rights are still
violations. Still another consequence brings us back to the start-
ing point of this article. In my view, it is the fact that interstate
federalism involves questions of political theory that accounts
for the peculiar lack of appreciation of the problem that general
scholarship has shown.
V. THE POLITICAL ORPHAN
Are such questions of political theory the appropriate prov-
ince of the left or the right? The reasons why the left might not
take on this social cause are easy enough to see. Typically, the
holders of "interstate federalism rights" are deep pock-
ets-corporations, private defendants represented by insurance
companies, and so forth. This is because the only persons worth
suing in the interstate context are those with the money to pay a
judgment large enough to make expensive interstate litigation
profitable. A possible exception arises in family law disputes,
where even persons of modest means can get drawn into expen-
sive litigation.78 Still another occasional exception may be crimi-
nal law-but both of these areas are conflict of laws backwaters
at present.79 In the usual case the injured party is likely to be
someone for whom the social reformers have little sympathy, es-
pecially in comparison to injured tort victims, to whom the legal
system is supposed to be engaged in redistributing wealth.
Then why is it that interstate federalism issues have not
77. Procedural due process issues often, of course, involve small amounts of money.
See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), which involved goods worth $500, far less
than the stake in many litigated choice of law disputes.
78. See, e.g., Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
79. L. BRILMAYER, supra note 5.
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been picked up by the right? The answer to that one, I think, is
more complicated. First consider the unclear relevance of the
concept of "state rights," a current conservative password. Con-
servatives might be disinclined to interfere with state choice of
law rules if they take a restrained position on judicial review of
state law. For every forum with which a plaintiff has aligned
himself, however, there is some alternative forum that the de-
fendant has selected as the best protector of her rights. Laissez-
faire doesn't maximize state interests because keeping the fed-
eral government off the back of one state, in this context, means
leaving that state free to prey upon the others.
The largest problem in appreciating these interstate federal-
ism rights probably is a different one, however, namely that vio-
lations of these rights resemble property rights but are actually
political rights. In the context of a particular case, the violation
of such rights may mean that the defendant has to hand over
money. But that does not mean that these rights are property
rights in the traditional sense. If a criminal defendant's proce-
dural rights were violated, the result might be that he or she was
unfairly convicted and required to pay a criminal fine, but the
fact that the injury was monetary does not mean that it was a
property right that was violated. I am not addressing the issue of
whether "property rights" are also civil rights, or whether they
are worthy of constitutional protection. On the issue of whether
they have equal status with (say) first amendment rights, I ex-
press no opinion. It is just that fitting interstate federalism
rights into a property rights mold makes them very difficult to
explain convincingly.
One proponent of the modern learning, for example, attacks
constitutional limits on choice of law by characterizing them as
"substantive due process." Early decisions of the Supreme Court
recognizing limits on choice of law were, he argues, the product
of a "Lochner" mentality.80 Issued at about the same time, and
written by the same Court, these opinions spoke the language of
protecting vested property rights and preventing impairments of
contract.81 If that is all that constitutional limits on choice of
law amount to, then it is not surprising that they find little cur-
80. Sedler, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law: The Perspective of Con-
stitutional Generalism, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 59 (1981).
81. Id. at 62-66 (describing cases).
HeinOnline -- 1987 BYU L. Rev. 975 1987
949] INTERSTATE FEDERALISM 975
rent favor, especially with liberals. They represent judicial activ-
ism with a bias in favor of vested property interests.
But vested property rights are not the only way to explain
these limitations. Indeed, property rights are not a very convinc-
ing way to explain interstate federalism because they do not ex-
plain why a state can impinge on the property interests of its
own citizens, or those acting within its own territory, in ways
that it cannot impinge on the property rights of outsiders. If Illi-
nois seeks to compel an out-of-state defendant to litigate in Illi-
nois, then it may not be imposing any hardship on the defend-
ant that would not be imposed on any local defendant. However,
it is not the imposition itself that is unreasonable, but the act of
imposing it upon an individual whom the government has no
right to impose upon. The defense can only be cogently mounted
from a posture of protecting political and civil liberties, where
even a de minimus offense is a matter of principle.
If this perspective does not neatly fall into either the left or
right wing pigeonholes, then neither does it exactly fall outside.
Because of its civil libertarian overtones, and because it involves
protection of property interests from unwarranted government
interference, interstate federalism ought to be a bipartisan issue.
And, it ought also to be a subject of some concern; right now, it
seems to be neither.
VI. CONCLUSION
An important first step is for lawyers and scholars outside the
closed circle of conflicts learning to become informed about what
is going on. Choice of law may seem like an arcane specialty, but
it is as much an element of the current legal scene as hot politi-
cal topics such as tort reform. Having been left to the conflicts
scholars, modern academic conflicts learning has become out of
touch with reality. Interstate federalism should be put back onto
our intellectual and political agendas; its constitutional protec-
tions simply could not be more timely.
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